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Tribal Jurisdiction Under Section 1911 (b) of the Indian
Child Welfare Act of 1878: Are the States Respecting
Indian Sovereignty?
I. INTRODUCTION
As with most areas of law, an enduring problem in federal Indian law
relates to jurisdiction. The question of which court system has authority
to hear cases involving Indians has remained constant for decades, in
spite of lawmakers' best efforts to resolve the issue.' While in some areas
of the law, tribal jurisdiction is being challenged 2 in at least one area,
child custody stemming from adoption and foster care placement, the
federal government has sought to expand tribal jurisdiction. Because the
matter of where and how minor tribal members are placed in- custody
proceedings is inextricably bound up in the survival of Native Americans
as an entity, Congress determined that tribes should have jurisdiction
over Indian child custody proceedings. In enacting the Indian child Welfare
Act of 1978,1 Congress gave tribes exclusive jurisdiction over proceedings4
in which the child was a resident or domiciliary on the tribal reservation.
Congress went even further by giving tribes jurisdiction over Indian
children living off the reservation.'
To effectuate tribal jurisdiction over custody matters involving member
children not living on the reservation, Congress mandated state courts
to transfer any custody proceedings involving tribal member children to

1. For discussion of lawmakers' efforts to resolve jurisdiction over Native Americans, see Sidney
Harring, Crow Dog's Case: A Chapter in the Legal History of Tribal Sovereignty, 14 AM. INDIAN
L. REV. 191 (1990); Robert Clinton, Development of Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands, 17
A=iZ. L. REV. 951 (1975); Nell Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and
Limitations, 132 U. PENN. L. REv. 195 (1984); FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK ON INDIAN LAW (1982
ed.).
2. See, e.g., Duro v. Reina, 485 U.S. 676 (1990), where the Supreme-Court held tribal courts
lacked criminal jurisdiction not only over non-Indians, but also over non-tribal member Native
Americans. The ruling was considered such an affront to tribal sovereignty that Congress introduced
legislation to reverse the Court's ruling. See Helen A. Gaebler, Comment, The Legislative Reversal
of Duro v. Reina: A First Step Toward Making Rhetoric A Reality, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 1399
("Within months of the Duro decision, Congress passed a temporary amendment to the Indian
Civil Rights Act that effectively reversed the Court's holding. The amendment clarified the meaning
of tribal 'powers of self-government' under 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) to include 'the inherent power of
Indian tribes . . . to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians."') Id. at 1401 (footnotes omitted).
The amendment became permanent in 1991. See also Nell Newton, Permanent Legislation To Correct
Duro v. Reina, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 109 (1992). The amended definition of Indian, under the
Indian Civil Rights Act, is "any person who would be subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States as an Indian under section 1153 of Title 18 if that person were to commit an offense listed
in that section in Indian country to which that section applies." 25 U.S.C. § 1301(4) (1992).
3. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608 (codified as 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963
(1978)) [hereinafter "ICWA" or "the Act"].
4. See Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1978)). Section
1911(a) gives tribal courts exclusive jurisdiction over child custody proceedings "involving any Indian
child who resides or is domiciled within the reservation of such tribe."
5. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b).
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tribal court, 6 with limited exceptions. 7 This Comment analyzes how the
state courts increasingly have relied on those exceptions to deny tribal
jurisdictional over Indian child custody matters. Contradicting ICWA's
preference for tribal jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings,
state courts are finding reasons not to transfer these cases to the tribes.
Instead, the courts are exercising their concurrent jurisdiction8 over Indian
child custody cases, when in fact ICWA mandates that they transfer
them to tribal court.
ORIGINS OF THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT AND ITS
TRIBAL JURISDICTION PROVISION
By the mid-1970s, the rate of Indian children being separated from
their families and tribes through placement in non-Indian foster care and
adoptive homes had reached an alarming proportion. 9 The House Report
on Indian Child Welfare stated:
The wholesale separation of Indian children from their famileies
[sic] is perhaps the most tragic and destructive aspect of American
Indian life today.
Surveys of States with large Indian populations conducted by the
Association of American Indian Affairs (AAIA) in 1969 and again
in 1974 indicate that approximately 25-35 percent of all Indian children
are separated from their families and placed in foster homes, adoptive
homes, or institutions. In some States, the problem is getting worse:
in Minnesota, one out of every eight Indian Child under 18 years of
age is living in an adoptive home; and in 1971-72, nearly one in every
four Indian children under 1 year of age was adopted. 10
II.

The Report indicated that, per capita, Indian children in Minnesota were
five times more likely than their non-Indian counterparts to be placed
in adoptive homes or foster care." In Montana, Indian children were

6. "In any State court proceeding for the foster care placement of, or termination of parental
rights to, an Indian child not domiciled or residing within the reservation of the Indian child's
Id.
I..." This
tribe, the court . .. shall transfer such proceeding to the jurisdiction of the tribe .
Congressional mandate is part of §1911(b) even though state courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction
and can exercise that jurisdiction.
7. See supra note 6 and accompanying text regarding § 1911(b)'s requirement that state courts
transfer Indian child custody proceedings. The exceptions to the mandate apply when the tribe
declines, when a parent vetoes the proposed transfer, or when a state court determines there is
good cause not to transfer the case. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b).
8. State and tribal courts share concurrent jurisdiction over Indian child custody cases. See
e.g., Joan Hollinger, Beyond the Best Interest of the Tribe: The Indian Child Welfare Act and the
Adoption of Indian Children, 66 U. DET. L. Rav. 451, 459-60 (1989) (states have concurrent
jurisdiction when Indian children live off the reservation); Patrice Kunesh-Hartman, The Indian
Child Welfare Act of 1978: Protecting Essential Tribal Interests, 60 U. CoLo. L. REv. 131, 14146 (1989) (discusses states' historical concurrent jurisdiction over matters involving Indians). However,
ICWA mandates preference for tribal jurisdiction. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (even when states enjoy
concurrent jurisdiction over Indian child custody matters, they "shall" transfer such proceedings
to tribal court).
9. See HousE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INsuLAR AFFAIRS, H. R. REP. No. 1386, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530.
10. Id. at 7531.
11. Id.
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thirteen times more likely to be put in such an environment.' 2 Close to
ninety percent of the adoptions and foster care situations involved an
Indian child going to live with a non-Indian family, the Indian child
thus being separated from his native heritage. 3 The future of the Native
American family, and of tribal survival, had reached a critical point.
Responding to this crisis, the federal government enacted the Indian
Child Welfare Act of 1978.' 4 The Act's twofold purpose is protecting
the best interests of Indian children and promoting tribal stability and
security. 5 ICWA sought to establish minimum federal standards governing
the removal and placement of Indian children from their biological
families, in order to closely regulate the "off reservation" placement of
Indian children. It also stressed the importance of allowing the child's
tribe to share in the child custody proceeding, thereby enhancing tribal
sovereignty by allowing the tribe a greater voice in shaping its own
destiny.' 6 In a phrase, the Act attempts to reverse a decline in tribal
jurisdiction over tribal members by mandating district courts to transfer
non-resident Indian cases to the tribal courts.
ICWA generally, and its jurisdictional provision in particular, came in
response to and were indicative of Native Americans moving off the7
reservations and into the cities, and thus creating an urban Indian class.'
As a result of the post-World War II federal Indian policy of termination
and relocation,' 8 as well as the high rates of unemployment,' 9 Indian
12. Id.
13. Id.
In South Dakota, 40 percent of all adoptions made by the State's Department of
Public Welfare since 1967-68 are of Indian children, yet Indians make up only 7
In Wisconsin, the risk- run by Indian
percent of the juvenile population ....
children of being separated from their parents is nearly 1,600 percent greater than
it is for non-Indian children ....
Id.
14. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1978).
15. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 ("The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of this Nation to
protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian
).
tribes and families ....
16. Id. Note that ICWA's scope is limited to removal of Indian children from their families
and placement of these children in foster or adoptive homes. See In re Bertleson, 617 P.2d 121
(Mont. 1980) (ICWA not directed at disputes within Indian families regarding custody of Indian
children); County of Inyo v. Jeff, 277 Cal. Rptr. 841 (Cal. App. 1991) (ICWA does not prevent
state from collecting child support from Indian father).
17. Note that the aggressive campaign by social service agencies, including religious missionaries,
to have reservation-born Indian children adopted by non-Indian urban couples also helped create
an urban Indian class. For discussion of the agencies' efforts to have Indian children adopted off
the reservation, see DAVID FANSHELL, FAR FROM THE RESERVATION: THE TRANSLAcIAL ADOPTION OF
AMERICAN INDIAN CHILDREN (1972); see also FRANCIS PRUCHA, INDIAN POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES:
HISTORICAL ESSAYS (1981).
18. Following World War II, federal Indian policy focused on terminating the federal government's
trusteeship of Indian lands and relocating Indians from reservations to urban areas around the
country where, it was believed, employment and educational opportunities were better, and where
Indians could integrate into mainstream society. For in-depth discussion, see DONALD FixIco, TERMINATION AND RELOCATION: FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY, 1945-1960 (Univ. of New Mexico Press 1986).
19. In 1969, for example, the unemployment rate reached forty-three percent on the Hopi
Reservation, topping fifty-one percent on the Navajo Reservation. Minnesota tribes suffered rates
of forty-two percent (Grand Portage), forty-three percent (White Earth), and forty-eight percent
(Fond du Lac). See FEDERAL AND STATE INDIAN RESERVATIONS: AN EDA HANDBOOK, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION (1971).
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families began leaving the reservations. Indian youth moved to the cities,
often far away from their homes, where chances for employment seemed
better, but where they were far from familiar surroundings. 20 Increasingly,
Indian children were born off the reservation. 2' Often, the parents of
these children were inadequately prepared to meet the challenges of
parenting. Perhaps the parents22 themselves were juveniles, or had a host
of substance abuse problems.

Upon learning that a child was in the custody of apparently unfit
parents, state child welfare departments typically sought to remove the
Indian child from the parents' custody. Prior to ICWA's enactment, the
state district court exercised jurisdiction over these child custody proceedings. At that time, there was no federal or state policy to transfer
a custody case to tribal court simply because the involved child was
Native American. 23 With ICWA's enactment, however, Congress required
state district courts to recognize the unique cases of urban Indians and
to transfer Indian child custody proceedings to tribal authorities.
Section 1911 of the Act describes the jurisdictional element of Indian
child welfare cases. Subsection (a) grants the tribe exclusive jurisdiction
over the custody proceeding of a child residing or domiciled within the
tribal reservation. 24 Subsection (c) gives the tribe "the right to intervene
at any point in the proceeding, ' 25 while subsection (d) requires federal
and state courts to give the same full faith and credit to tribal court26
custody proceedings as they would grant to any other judicial entity.
The subject of this Comment, subsection 1911(b), states:
In any State court proceeding for the foster care placement of or
termination of parental rights to, an Indian child not domiciled or
residing within the reservation of the Indian child's tribe, the court,

20. See supra note 18.
21. See generally ELAINE M. NEn.S, RESERVATION TO Crrv (1971); ALAN L. SORKIN, THE URBAN
AMERICAN INDIAN (1978); CHRISTINE BOLT, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY AND AMERICAN REFORM: CASE
STUDIES OF THE CAMPAIGN TO ASSIMILATE THE AMERICAN INDIANS (1987).

22. See, e.g., In re D.S., 577 N.E.2d 572 (Ind. 1991) (parental rights of urban Potawatomi
Indian mother terminated due to alcoholism); In re C.W., 479 N.W.2d 105 (Neb. 1992) (parental
rights of Rosebud Sioux mother terminated due to substance abuse); A.H. v. State, 779 P.2d 1228
(Alaska 1989) (state terminated parental rights of Eskimo mother who was considered a serious
suicide risk).
23. Note, however, that by the mid-1970s, the federal government recognized limited exclusive
tribal jurisdiction over member Indians living on the reservation. See Wisconsin Potowatomies v.
Houston, 393 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Mich. 1973); Wakefield v. Little Light, 347 A.2d 228 (Md. 1975)
("[Tihere can be no greater threat to 'essential tribal relations' and no greater infringement on the
right of the . . . tribe to govern themselves (sic) than to interfere with tribal control over the custody
of their children."). Under 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a), "lain Indian tribe shall have exclusive jurisdiction
as to any State over any child custody proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is
domiciled within the reservation of each tribe ...." See also Letter from Forrest J. Gerard, Asst.
Sec., U.S. Dept. of Interior, to Rep. M. Udall, Chairman, Comm. in Int. and Insular Affairs
(June 6, 1978) reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7553 ("[Section 1911(a)] would vest in tribal courts
their already acknowledged right to exclusive jurisdiction over Indian child placements within their
reservations.") (emphasis added).
24. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a).
25. Id. § 1911(c).
26. See id. § 1911(d).
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in the absence of good cause to the contrary, shall transfer such
proceedings to the jurisdiction of the tribe, absent objection by either
parent, upon the petition of either parent or the Indian custodian or
shall be subject
the Indian child's tribe; Provided, That such transfer
27
to declination by the tribal court of such tribe.
This subsection reflects longstanding federal policy, that is, to enhance
tribal sovereignty and survival by allowing tribes to adjudicate child
custody cases involving tribal members, even when those members do
not live on the reservation. Because children are its future, the tribes,
through their court systems, need a greater voice in determining the
placement of their member children.2 Congress considered the jurisdictional provisions of the Act, which expanded tribal court jurisdiction to
hear non-resident Indian child welfare cases, to be a legitimate manner
in which to achieve the national federal policy of promoting Indian selfgovernment.
III.

IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 1911(b) OF THE INDIAN
CHILD WELFARE ACT

Section 1911(b) applies to state court custody proceedings involving
Indian children residing off the reservation.2 9 It requires state courts to
transfer these proceedings to the affected child's tribal court. Within
section 1911(b) are three narrowly tailored exceptions allowing a state
court to exercise its concurrent jurisdiction. First, the tribe itself may
decline to accept jurisdictional transfer.30 Next, an objection by either
parent effectively vetoes the transfer from state to tribal court." Finally,
that there is good
the state court can prevent transfer by determining
32
cause not to allow a tribal court to hear the case.
When a tribe declines jurisdiction, or either parent objects to the
intended transfer, states exercise their concurrent jurisdiction, and the
Indian child custody case remains in district court. Jurisdictional questions
become more problematic, however, when the state courts attempt to
define, then apply, good cause. With few exceptions, the definitions state
courts have composed allow state courts to refuse to transfer jurisdiction
to the tribes. 3 State courts usually are able to fashion a definition of
good cause which precludes a tribe from hearing the case. This Comment
examines each of the three exceptions.

27. Id. § 1911(b) (emphasis in original).
28. The House Report noted the "legitimate interest of the Indian tribe in preserving and
protecting the Indian family as the wellspring of its own future." HousE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND
INsuLAR AFFAIRs, H. R. REP. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7541.
29. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b). Compare 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a), vesting tribal courts with exclusive
jurisdiction over child custody proceedings for children residing or domiciled on the reservation.
30. 25 U.S.C. §1911(b).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See infra notes 61-124 and accompanying text for discussion regarding "good cause".
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Tribal Declination
Prior to ICWA's enactment, some feared the provision in section 1911(b)
allowing tribes to decline jurisdiction would cause an unfair burden on
the state court system:

A.

[T]ribal courts may pick and choose those Indian children over which
they will exercise jurisdiction, however State courts are allowed no
choice. One potential result, of course, is that tribal courts will waive
jurisdiction in all difficult or expensive cases while State courts ...
will have no choice4 but to accept these cases. Such a situation is
clearly inequitable.1
As ICWA cases began to be adjudicated, however, such fears seemed
misplaced, as tribes rarely decline jurisdiction.
One of the few reported cases in which a tribe exercised its declination
power involved termination of parental rights. In In re B.R.B.,35 a woman
claiming Cheyenne River Sioux heritage appealed the termination of her
parental rights.16 She charged the district court with failing to apply the
ICWA in adjudicating the case.37 In affirming the district court, the
South Dakota Supreme Court noted that "[tihe tribe declined jurisdiction
without indicating the eligibility status of either the mother or child." 3
Thus, the question of jurisdiction was summarily answered. The record
did not reflect why the tribe declined jurisdiction, simply that the tribe
was notified of the child custody proceeding and chose to decline. Such
declination is within the sound discretion of the tribal court.3 9
Tribal courts can decline jurisdiction even when an affected litigant
demands tribal participation. In In re Laurie R. ,4 the Cheyenne-Arapahoe
tribal court executed a written waiver of participation in the New Mexico
state court proceedings involving a minor tribal member. 41 Laurie R.,
like her deceased father, was an enrolled member of the CheyenneArapahoe tribe. Her mother, the subject of this parental rights termination
action, was a non-Indian. 42 In honoring the tribal court's right to decline
jurisdiction, the state court held the tribal court's written waiver constituted a declination, 4 even though Laurie R.'s mother demanded transfer
to tribal court, and the tribal court could rightfully have heard the case.

34. Letter from Richard A. Weber, Staff Attorney, Office of Legal Affairs, Montana Dept. of
Soc. and Rehab. Services, to Rep. Ron Marlenee, Congressman from Montana, HousE CoMm. ON
INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, H. R. REP. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7566.
35. 381 N.W.2d 283 (S.D. 1986).
36. Id. at 284.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (1978); see also In re Wayne R.N., 107 N.M. 341, 757 P.2d 1333 (Ct.
App. 1988), where tribal court refused jurisdiction on grounds, inter alia, that "Tribe's attorney
stated that the Tribes were opposed to a transfer." Id.
40. 107 N.M. 529, 760 P.2d 1295 (Ct. App. 1988).
41. Id.at 533, 757 P.2d at 1299.
42. Id.at 534, 757 P.2d at 1296.
43. Id. at 533, 757 P.2d at 1299.
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The state court concluded that the tribal court could not be forced to
accept jurisdiction, even at the mother's insistence."4
Section 1911(b) of the Act permits a tribe to refuse a state's offer to
transfer jurisdiction.4 5 Nothing in the Act requires a tribal court to explain
why it is exercising its declination power, and no state courts have
transferred a child custody case to tribal court against the tribe's will.
Even when an affected litigant wants a tribal court to hear a case and
that court otherwise has competent jurisdiction, states respect a tribe's
section 1911(b) declination power. Jurisdiction declination by a tribe
effectively requires a state court to exercise its concurrent jurisdiction
over such matters.
Parental objection
The second exception to section 1911 (b)'s requirement that state courts
transfer Indian child custody matter to tribal court arises when either
parent objects." Even where the state has offered to transfer the proceedings, and the tribe has indicated its desire to adjudicate the matter,
there is no guarantee of transfer. Generally, a case transfers only when
the state court, the tribal court and the parents all agree that it shall
transfer. If a parent objects to the intended transfer, the Indian child
custody matter proceeds in state court.
Before a tribal court exercises jurisdiction over a custody matter, a
jurisdictional hearing must be held, and the parent(s) given an opportunity
to exercise his own section 1911(b) power to veto transfer to tribal court.
In In re G.L.O.C. , 4 the Montana state district court transferred a child
custody hearing to the Crow tribe without first giving the child's father
an opportunity to object to the transfer. 48 On appeal, the state court
held that "a jurisdictional hearing is required before the court can enter
an order granting or denying a request for the transfer of jurisdiction
of Indian children to tribal custody." ' 49 It added that "[a] transfer of
jurisdiction to Tribal Court, without giving a parent the right to object
to a transfer of jurisdiction [might] plung[e] the children into circumstances
that are traumatic or otherwise not in their best interest. That is precisely
why a jurisdictional hearing is required before a transfer order is entered
B.

44. Id.
45. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (1978).
46. Id. (state courts shall transfer Indian child custody proceedings to tribal courts "absent
objection by either parent"). The statute's plain language controls jurisdiction - if one or both
parents object to transfer from state to tribal court, transfer will not occur. Id.; see also In re
R.I., 402 N.W.2d 173 (Minn. App. 1987) (court rejected argument that, upon receiving parental
objection, a state court can, in its discretion, nevertheless transfer the case to tribal court: "We
have found no authority for the . . . assertion that upon receiving a parental objection, the decision
to transfer is discretionary. Other jurisdictions have held that parental objection mandates the
retention of the action in state court.") Id. at 177 (emphasis in original) (citing In re Adoption of
Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168, 178 (Kan. 1982); In re S.Z., 325 N.W.2d 53, 65 (S.D. 1982)).
47. 668 P.2d 235 (Mont. 1988).
48. Id. at 236.
49. Id. at 237.
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Thus, not only can a parent object, but further, he must have

the opportunity to object.
Section 1911(b) also addresses cases in which a parent submits herself
to tribal jurisdiction, only to later object to transfer from state to tribal
court. In In re M.R.D.B., 51 a White Mountain Apache mother placed
her child with a non-Indian family in Colorado. 2 A little over a year
later, the mother withdrew her consent to the Colorado adoption, and
asked the White Mountain Apache Tribe for assistance.53 Shortly thereafter, the tribal court accepted jurisdiction over the case and custody of
the child.5 4 The Colorado court, giving full faith and credit to the tribal
court, ordered the child turned over the tribe, which in turn gave custody
of the child to the natural mother." Later, the mother again sought to
place her child with the Colorado family, this time proceeding in state
court.5 6 When the White Mountain Apache Tribal Court sought jurisdictional transfer, the mother now objected.5 7 The Montana court held
that when a parent submits to tribal jurisdiction, and the child becomes
a ward of the tribal court, the parent cannot later prevent transfer to
tribal court by objection. Having obtained jurisdiction over the child
custody matter, the tribal court gained exclusive jurisdiction, and the
mother was estopped from denying that the tribe had such jurisdiction.5 9
Section 1911(b) protects a parent's right to veto jurisdictional transfer
from state to tribal court. Nothing in the section requires a parent to
explain why he objects. The fact that he does object is sufficient to
defeat transfer.6 Importantly, even when the state and tribes agree that
the tribe has competent jurisdiction, the parents must have the opportunity
to object. However, once a tribal court has jurisdiction, it has exclusive
jurisdiction.
C.

"Good Cause"
The first two jurisdictional transfer exceptions in Section 1911(b) require
little judicial interpretation. Either a tribe declines jurisdiction, or it does
not; either a parent vetoes the transfer to tribal court, or she does not.

50. Id. at 238.
51. 787 P.2d 1219 (Mont. 1990).
52. Id. at 1220.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1222.
58. Id.
59. M.R.D.B. is a most interesting case in that it shows the transformation of a § 1911(b) case
into a § 1911(a) case. When the mother first withdrew her consent to the adoption by the nonIndian Colorado family, she could have, but did not, object to the transfer to tribal court, as per
her § 1911(b) veto right. Indeed, by asking the White Mountain Apache tribal court to assume
jurisdiction, she implicitly consented to its exclusive jurisdiction under § 1911(a). Having waived
her § 1911(b) right, the mother could not later assert that right.
60. Note, however, that once a parent waives his § 1911(b) veto right, then a later objection
does not defeat a jurisdictional transfer. A tribe having gained jurisdiction, that jurisdiction becomes
exclusive. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (1978).
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In contrast, the third exception is most problematic because it gives state
courts great interpretive powers. This exception allows a state court to
'6
refuse to transfer jurisdiction to a tribal court based on "good cause," '
a uniquely subjective determination. A tribal court may consider spurious
62
what a state court considers good cause not to transfer jurisdiction.
A serious flaw in "good cause" cases is the state courts' tendency to
answer prematurely the substantive question of the case without first
determining whether they have jurisdiction to hear the case. Instead of
transferring Indian child custody matters as Congress desired when enacting ICWA, state courts are employing the ethereal and subjective
concepts of "good cause," "undue hardship," and "best interest" to
deny tribal courts the opportunity to hear Indian child custody cases.
In so doing, state courts often confuse the jurisdiction issue with the
substantive determination, merging them into one. For example, a court
might use the same "good cause" why an Indian child should stay in
her present (non-Indian) home as "good cause" to refuse a jurisdictional
transfer. While there may be a perfectly acceptable reason why the child
should stay where she is, that reason is not the same as "good cause"
why a tribal court should be denied its right to hear the child's custody
63
case, and presumably make a well-reasoned decision of its own.
Perhaps more troubling is that in finding good cause not to transfer,
state courts implicitly suggest that tribal courts are incapable of arriving
at reasonable conclusions regarding custody of their own member children,
or that state courts are in a better position than tribal ones to determine
what is in an Indian child's best interest." Such gratuitous paternalism
perpetuates the very practice that section 1911(b) sought to end-that an
Indian would best be served by remaining dependent on the dominant
judicial system to determine for him what is in his and his children's
best interest. The Supreme Court explicitly rejected this sentiment when
it noted that "we must defer to the experience, wisdom, and compassion
to fashion an appropriate remedy [in Indian
of the ... tribal courts
'65
child welfare cases]."
1. Undue hardship
In an attempt to help state courts determine what constitutes good
cause to deny jurisdictional transfer, the Bureau of Indian Affairs prom-

61. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (State courts shall transfer Indian child custody proceedings "in the
absence of good cause to the contrary.")
62. Also, tribal courts can have a perception problem when objecting to a transfer denial. Most
lay observers assume the correctness of a state court's determination that good cause exists not to
transfer. Thus, when a tribal court questions a state court's refusal, the tribal court may appear
self-seeking rather than concerned with the child's best interest.
63. See, e.g., In re Robert T., 246 Cal. Rptr. 168 (Cal. App. 1988) (according to state court,
fact that Indian child already bonded with non-Indian family constituted good cause to refuse
jurisdictional transfer).
64. See infra notes 105-24 and accompanying text.
65. Mississippi Choctaw Indian Band v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 54 (1989) (quoting In re Adoption
of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 972 (Utah 1986)).
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ulgated non-binding guidelines to aid the courts in adjudicating the
jurisdictional question.6 6 In addressing jurisdictional transfer, state courts
can look to the Guidelines for guidance. The Guidelines list several possible
"good cause" reasons why a case might not be transferred: the tribe
does not have a tribal court, 67 the proceedings were at an advanced stage
in state court when the transfer petition was received, 68 the child is over
twelve years of age and objects to the transfer, 69 the parents of a child
over five are unavailable and the child has had no significant contact
with the tribe, 70 or the evidence could not be presented in tribal court
without undue hardship to the parties or witnesses. 7 1 In Comments to
the Guidelines, the drafters suggested that the geographic distance between
2
state and tribal courts may, but does not necessarily, constitute a hardship.
Thus, the burden of presenting all the necessary evidence in tribal court
may create "good cause" not to transfer jurisdiction.
Implicit in section 1911(b) and the Guidelines is the need for state
courts to balance state and tribal interests in hearing an Indian child
custody case. State courts must weigh the burden of transferring a case
from state to tribal court with the benefit, and federal goal, 73 of allowing
a tribe to determine the future of its children, and itself. A few state
courts have acknowledged this implicit balancing test, noting that when
considering jurisdiction, district courts "should balance the interests of
the state and the tribe." ' 74 But the present trend in interpreting section
1911 (b) and the Guidelines is that any distance which imposes any hardship
on case participants is sufficient good cause to deny a transfer.7 5 Such
haste in denying tribal jurisdiction defeats the spirit of the ICWA, which
is to strengthen tribal integrity by transferring relevant cases to tribal
court.
State courts are at their strongest in refusing jurisdictional transfer
because of undue hardship when the distance between state and tribal
court is what one might objectively classify as "long." Only the most
obdurate tribal partisan would fail to see the undue burden a long distance
jurisdictional transfer could occasion. State courts persuasively show good
cause when the distance between state and tribal court is several hundred
miles. For example, in Chester County Department of Social Services v.

66. Guidelines for State Courts: Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584 (1979)
[hereinafter, "Guidelines"].
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. The Supreme Court has ruled that greater Native American self-government is a fundamental
aspect of federal Indian policy. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
74. In re of C.W., 479 N.W.2d 105, 113 (Neb. 1992); see also In re Bertleson, 617 P.2d 121
(Mont. 1980) (when considering whether to retain or transfer jurisdiction, state courts should balance
state and tribal interests). Id. at 129-30.
75. See infra notes 83-104 and accompanying text.
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Coleman,76 a Cheyenne River Sioux family lived in South Carolina, some
two thousand miles from the reservation. 77 In 1983, the children were
removed from the parents' custody after allegations of physical and sexual
abuse. 78 The parents moved to transfer jurisdiction to the Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribal Court in South Dakota. 79 In finding good cause not to
transfer, the South Carolina court noted the undue hardship which would
result if all of the case participants had to travel to South Dakota.
"Here, the bulk of the evidence and the majority of the witnesses necessary
for the termination of parental rights action are located in South Carolina
.... All of the witnesses to the physical and sexual abuse, as well as
records of treatment and evaluation, are located in South Carolina, while80
the tribal court is located several thousand miles away in South Dakota.
Because of the distance between the two states, and taking note of the
Guidelines' suggestion that good cause to deny transfer may occur when
the case cannot be heard in tribal court without undue hardship, the
court denied the transfer request. 8'
Denying jurisdictional transfer because of the hundreds of miles between
the state and tribal court is perhaps the most legitimate "good cause"
reason, and it finds support in the Guidelines. Yet a principal drawback
to finding "good cause" based on geographic distance is that the tribal
courts of remote states like Alaska are virtually assured to receive 1911(b)transferred cases only in the most rare cases. If a state court will not
transfer a case within the contiguous United States because of geographic
distance, it would be even less inclined to transfer8 2jurisdiction over a
foreign country, into the remote reaches of Alaska.
A more troubling result than a refusal to transfer jurisdiction across
the country occurs when a state court finds good cause not to transfer

76. 399 S.E.2d 773 (S.C. 1990).
77. Id. at 774. Distance measurements taken from the NATIONAL ATLAS OF THE UNITED STATES,
U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, GEOLOGICAL SURVEY (1970).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 776. While the decision of the South Carolina court was well-founded, its hyperbolic
portrayal of the tribal court as "several thousand miles away" perpetuates the public perception
that tribal courts are "way out there", impenetrable, inaccessible. In fact, the Cheyenne River Sioux
tribal court is "only" 2,000 miles from South Carolina, and accessible by air and road. Two
thousand miles is far indeed, but it is not "several thousand miles."
81. Id. at 775; see also In re Robert T., 246 Cal. Rptr. 168 (Cal. App. 1988) (California court
refused transfer to New Mexico tribal court on grounds, inter alia, of long distance); In re Adoption
of K.L.R.F., 515 A.2d 33 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (Pennsylvania court upheld decision denying transfer
to South Dakota tribal court based partly on distance); In re Adoption of T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d
298 (Ind. 1988) (distance between Indiana state court and South Dakota tribal court constituted
undue hardship). But see In re Armell, 550 N.E.2d 1060 (Ill. App. 1990) (court accepted witnesses'
statements that distance between Illinois and South Dakota tribal court did not create undue burden).
82. See, e.g., In re T.S., 801 P.2d 77 (Mont. 1990) (Montana court refused to transfer case to
Alaskan native village court based, inter alia, on "undue hardship if the parties and witnesses were
required to travel from Montana in order to appear in Tribal Court in Alaska.") Id. at 82. The
obvious question, "what is long?" remains unanswered, and perhaps unanswerable, because the
answer is subjective (i.e., what is long to a state court may be close to a tribal court). Thus state
courts are free to tailor the answer to their own satisfaction. A distance is long when a state court
says a distance is long.
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based on distance in the middle and shorter range. 83 The Guidelines
suggest that good cause to deny a jurisdictional transfer may exist when
the evidence necessary to decide the case could not be adequately presented4
in the tribal court without undue hardship on the parties or the witnesses.1
The Guidelines clearly suggest that case parties and participants will
endure at least some hardship when the district court transfers an Indian
child custody matter to tribal court. What they caution against is undue
hardship. Yet many state courts rule as if any hardship, even that caused
by middle or shorter distances, is good cause not to transfer jurisdiction. s5
This increasingly liberal interpretation of "hardship" defeats the letter
and the spirit of ICWA, which is to transfer Indian child custody cases
to tribal courts even when such transfers may cause some hardship to
case participants.
Generally, state courts have refused to transfer cases except when the
tribal court is quite close. For example, in In re Bird Head,86 a Nebraska
court roughly one hundred miles from the Oglala Sioux tribal court in
South Dakota refused to transfer an Indian child custody case, based,
87
inter alia, on the undue hardship travelling to tribal court would cause.
The court noted that among the "ample evidence" which established
good cause for denying transfer, the Indian child resided in Sheridan
County, Nebraska, while the child's tribe and the tribal court were in
far off South Dakota. 8 In fact, Sheridan County abuts the South Dakota
county in which the Oglala Sioux tribal court is located. Likewise, in
In re J.R.H.,89 an Iowa court found good cause to refuse jurisdictional
transfer based on the four hundred mile distance between the Iowa state
court and the South Dakota tribal court. "In determining good cause,
we may consider the circumstances when the 'evidence necessary to decide
the case could not be adequately presented in the tribal court without
undue hardship of the parties or the witnesses." ' 9 The court denied the
transfer. 9'

83. The terms "long," "medium," and "short" are as ethereal and subjective as "good cause,"
"undue hardship," and "best interest," and certainly as arbitrary. For purposes of this comment,
long means distances over 500 miles, medium indicates distances in the 100-500 mile range, and
short signifies distances under 100 miles.
84. Guidelines, supra note 66, at 67,591.
85. See, e.g., In re Maricopa County Juvenile Action, 828 P.2d 1245 (Ariz. App. 1991) (500
miles between Phoenix, Arizona and Santo Domingo Pueblo, New Mexico tribal court was undue
hardship); In re C.W., 479 N.W.2d 105 (Neb. 1992) (400 miles between Nebraska state court and
Oglala Sioux tribal court in South Dakota created burden); C.E.H. v. L.M.W., 837 S.W.2d 947
(Mo. App. 1992) (275 miles between Kansas City, Missouri and Cherokee Nation tribal court in
Oklahoma constituted undue burden). Note that distance, and not the possible jurisdictional dilemma
arising from crossing state lines, is the determinative factor.
86. 331 N.W.2d 785 (Mo. 1983).
87. Id. at 790.
88. Id. Curiously, the record is silent as to whether the presumably affected parties (i.e., witnesses,
experts, social workers, etc.) brought up the hardship issue, or whether the court unilaterally
determined that the geographical distance constituted good cause.
89. 358 N.W.2d 311 (Iowa 1984).
90. Id. at 317 (quoting Guidelines For State Courts: Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed.
Reg. 67,591 (1979)).
91. Id.
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Perhaps the most egregious abuse of the state court's jurisdictional
transfer power is the refusal to refer a case to a tribal court within a
relatively short distance from the state court. 92 When a state court refuses
transfer in such a case, it guts section 1911(b)'s intent to promote tribal
jurisdiction over Indian child custody cases and reduces it to a meaningless
provision. If even a short distance is an "undue hardship", then a state
court can completely ignore Congress' mandate that tribal courts hear
Indian child welfare cases.
In In re N.L.,91 an Oklahoma court refused to transfer an Indian child
custody case some ninety miles away within the state.9 The court noted
that "[g]ood cause to deny a transfer has been found where almost all
of the parties and witnesses reside in the county of the state court . . . 95
The court performed no balancing between any hardship the witnesses
might have experienced with the benefit of allowing tribes to shape their
own destiny by helping determine the future of their children. It simply
found the ninety miles from state to tribal court to be a geographical
barrier. Instead of finding a reason to transfer jurisdiction as ICWA
suggests, the court here found a reason not to transfer.
In In re J.J.,96 the South Dakota Supreme Court upheld a district
court decision not to transfer a case from Rapid City to the Standing
Rock Sioux Tribal Court, 97 noting "the Tribal court is quite a long
distance from Rapid City .
"..."98
While the one hundred or so miles
between Rapid City and the Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Court may seem
substantial to urbanites, it cannot be considered "quite a long distance"
in the context of rural and sparsely-populated South Dakota. If a state
court will not transfer a case to a tribal court a short distance away,
under what circumstances will it transfer a case? The South Dakota
court's reasoning suggests transfer is appropriate only when there are
absolutely no burdens.
Distance between state and tribal courts can be so great as to constitute
undue hardship on some case participants. 99 Tribal courts may be several
hundred miles away, or the time and expense of travelling to tribal court
may be so great as to warrant the state court exercising its concurrent
jurisdiction.'3 00 But the increasing disposition of state courts to consider
virtually any distance from state to tribal court to be a good cause to
deny jurisdictional transfer is troubling. This unfortunate trend "could

92. See infra notes 93-104.
93. 754 P.2d 863 (Okla. 1988).
94. Id. at 868-69.
95. Id. at 869 (citing In re Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982); In re Bird Head, 331
N.W.2d 785 (Neb. 1980)).
96. 454 N.W.2d 317 (S.D. 1990).
97. Id. at 330.
98. Id.
99. See, e.g.,Chester County Dep't of Social Serv. v. Coleman, 399 S.E.2d 773 (S.C. 1990)
(distance between South Carolina and South Dakota); In re T.S., 801 P.2d 77 (Mont. 1990) (distance
between Montana and Alaska); see also supra note 81.
100. See cases cited supra note 99.
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preclude transferring jurisdiction to tribal court
except in cases where
°l
the child resides on or near a reservation.''
This Comment does not mean to suggest that medium and short
distances never constitute an undue burden on case participants. Theoretically, there may be situations when even a short distance constitutes
a hardship. What is troubling is the state courts' bland assertion, without
more, that distance "could" constitute an undue hardship.102 Currently,
the courts speak in hypothetical terms, instead of detailing how distance
creates an undue hardship in a particular case. For state court decisions
to be more convincing and less troubling, each court must explicitly show
how the distance between state and tribal court constitutes an actual
undue burden. At present, some courts merely assert that a tribal court
is far away, as if that in and of itself is adequate "good cause" to deny
jurisdictional transfer.103
State courts must avoid reflexively declaring distances as insurmountable
obstacles to jurisdictional transfer. Instead, they ought to first clearly
identify the potential hardship, and then balance that potential hardship
of presenting the case in tribal court with the federal policy of allowing
tribal courts to adjudicate Indian child custody cases. Only after performing the balancing test should state courts declare a jurisdictional
transfer to be an "undue hardship". They need to be more thoughtful
of ICWA's intent and mindful of its express tribal court preference before4
declaring geographic distance as good cause not to transfer jurisdiction.'0
2. "Best Interest"
The twofold purpose of the Indian Child Welfare Act is laid out in
section 1902: "The Congress hereby declares it is the policy of this Nation
to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability
and security of Indian tribes . . . ."10 The inclusion of the conjunctive
"and" signals a congressional mandate that state courts consider both
the child's well-being and the tribe's interest when adjudicating Indian
child custody matters. Recognition of such a mandate is in line with the
spirit of the Act, and is reflected in the letter of the law. Section 1902

101. In re Armell, 550 N.E.2d 1060, 1067 (II1. App. 1990). As both In re J.J., 454 N.W.2d 317
(S.D. 1990) and In re N.L., 754 P.2d 863 (Okla. 1988) make clear, transfer to tribal courts is not
assured even when the child lives near the reservation. In both cases, state courts denied jurisdictional
transfer to tribal courts less than 100 miles away from state court.
102. See, e.g., In re C.W., 479 N.W.2d 105 (Neb. 1992) (asserting that transfer "would cause
an undue burden" but neglecting to show how it would cause burden); In re C.E.H., 837 S.W.2d
947 (Mo. App. 1992) (asserting that tribal court was less convenient forum, but failing to show
how jurisdictional transfer would be undue burden).
103. See cases cited supra note 102.
104. In order to fulfill ICWA's mandate to transfer Indian child custody cases to tribal jurisdiction,
Congress should consider amending § 1911(b) such that state courts are estopped from denying
transfer on the basis of undue hardship when the distance between state and tribal court is less
than 500 miles. When the distance between state and tribal court is over 500 miles and the state
court is inclined to deny jurisdictional transfer, then that court must detail the basis for its denial,
and the reasoning used in deciding that a certain distance, ipso facto, creates an undue hardship.
105. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1978).
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does not suggest that the two interests are mutually exclusive, or that
they should be balanced against each other. Rather, it reflects Congress'
intention that state courts consider both interests.106
State courts, unfortunately, have been disposed to ignore the tribal
interest altogether, focusing only on what it considers to be in the Indian
child's best interest.10 7 Courts implicitly balance the child's well-being
against tribal interests, whereas section 1902 suggests a national policy
of giving both interests equal consideration. 108
Intuitively, considering an Indian child's best interest in custody proceedings would seem to make sense, and not at all contrary to ICWA's
goals. Indeed, section 1902 clearly states that protection of the Indian
child's best interest is one of the Act's stated purposes.'0 9 Yet denying
jurisdictional transfer based on the Indian child's best interest is troubling
for several reasons. To begin, there is no federally-defined "best interest
of the Indian child" standard. As a result, state courts are free to impose
their own standard." 0 Tribal courts thus are confronted with fifty distinct

106. Unfortunately, while the Act urges state courts to consider the child's and the tribe's interests,
it does not define those interests. At present, the Act allows state courts to fashion their own
definition. See infra note 110. Note also the federal policy of Indian preference in areas substantially
related to tribal sovereignty. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) ("[Indian] preference is
a longstanding, important component of the Government's Indian program." Id. at 550. The Court
went on to affirm Congressional policy when that policy "is reasonably and rationally designed to
further [Indian] self-government." Id. at 555.) The preference extends to Congressional preference
for tribal court jurisdiction over Indian child custody matters. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (1978).
107. The most notable exception to courts' general refusal to consider the tribal interest came
in Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989), in which the Court
explicitly took note of § 1902's purpose of "promot[ing] the stability and security of Indian tribes."
Id. at 49. Holyfield is often considered the preeminent case urging states to consider both the
child's and the tribe's interest. See, e.g., Richard Taylor, Curbing the Erosion of the Rights of
Native Americans: Was the Supreme Court Successful in Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v.
Holyfield?, 20 J. FAm. L. 171 (1990/91) (Holyfield is important in its interpretation of ICWA's
purpose to "preserve and protect Indian culture and heritage"). But see Ester Kim, Mississippi
Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield: The Contemplating of All, the Best Interests of None, 43
RUTGERS L. REV. 734 (1991) ("The ICWA's goals to protect the 'best interests of Indian children'
and to promote the 'stability and security of Indian tribes and families' are laudable, but unattainable.
The Act did not anticipate the possibility that the interests of these three parties-the children, the
tribes, and the parents-may not be identical. In fact, Holyfield exemplifies that very possibility.")
Id. at 793.
108. See, e.g., In re Robert T., 246 Cal. Rptr. 168 (Cal. App. 1988) (Indian child's best interest
required state court to hear the case); In re T.S., 801 P.2d 77 (Mont. 1990) (suggesting that allowing
tribal court to come to a different conclusion than state court regarding ultimate placement of the
child would devastate Indian child); In re C.W., 479 N.W.2d 105 (Neb. 1992) (transfer to tribal
court could harm child's best interest).
109. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1988).
110. Early state court decisions treating an Indian child's best interest have led to adverse results
for tribal jurisdiction over Indian children. In Montana, for example, in one of the earliest ICWA
cases, a court suggested that the child's best interest might prevent a jurisdictional transfer upon
a "clear and convincing" showing by the State. In re M.E.M., 635 P.2d 1313, 1317 (Mont. 1981).
The court there did not cite the source from which it drew this conclusion, and seems to have
made the assertion as if in passing. Later court decisions treated this unsupported dicta as legal
precedent, so that now, this vaguely-defined 'best interest of the child' test will be applied in
Montana in determining good cause not to transfer jurisdiction of custody proceedings of Indian
children under § 1911(b)." In re T.S., 801 P.2d 77, 80 (1990) (emphasis added) (citing M.E.M.,
635 P.2d at 1317). Other states' courts are misapplying M.E.M. and imposing a "best interest of
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"best interest of the child" standards, none of which address the unique
problems of an Indian child. Also, while the standard certainly has a
place in Indian child custody cases, as it does in any custody case, it
is applicable only at the placement stage."' Presently, however, states
are applying the standard at the jurisdictional stage. The effect is to
deny tribal courts any input in the determination of what is in a tribal
member's best interest.
Equally disturbing is that by refusing to transfer Indian child custody
matters to tribal courts, state courts show a lack of full faith and credit
in the actions of tribal courts, 2 thereby suggesting that they, better than
tribal courts, know what is in an Indian child's best interest. It was this
same well-meaning but debilitating paternalism which ICWA sought to
prevent. State courts summarily dismiss tribal jurisdiction under the guise
of best interests, and then proceed to answer the substantive issue of
the case." 3
State courts can convincingly enumerate the many good reasons why
the child should remain where he is. Invariably, however, the courts
neglect to demonstrate how it is in the child's best interest to deny his
tribe's court the right to adjudicate the matter. For example, in In re
Robert T., ' 4 a California court considered a New Mexico tribal court's
request for jurisdictional transfer." 5 Among the numerous reasons the

the child" standard at the jurisdictional stage. See, e.g., In re Maricopa County Juvenile Action,
828 P.2d 1245 (Ariz. 1991) ("A trial court may properly consider an Indian child's best interest
when deciding whether to transfer a custody proceeding to tribal court.") Id. at 1251 (citing M.E.M.);
In re Robert T., 246 Cal. Rptr. 168 (Cal. App. 1988) (court was "satisfied that [Indian child's
best interest] is a pertinent and indeed an necessary consideration in deciding whether to grant or
deny a transfer request.") Id. at 175 (citing M.E.M.); In re T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d 298 (Ind. 1988)
(applying M.E.M.'s contention that child's best interest can defeat jurisdictional transfer). Id. at
307-08. By merging the jurisdictional and substantive questions, state courts have strayed from
Congress's goal of transferring Indian child custody cases to tribal courts. By applying the best
interest standard at the jurisdictional stage, the states obviate any tribal participation, in clear
contravention of the federal policy of tribal preference.
111. See, e.g., In re Armell, 550 N.E.2d 1060 (11. App. 1990) ("The United States Supreme
Court in Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield ... reasoned that when Congress enacted
the ICWA, it intended nationwide uniformity of terms and that state laws should not frustrate that
intention. Therefore, the ICWA's provisions regarding "good cause" not to transfer jurisdiction
should not be interpreted by individual state law. [Individual state standards] are therefore inapplicable
to ICWA's jurisdictional requirements.") (citations omitted). Best interest is clearly a proper consideration when deciding the ultimate placement of an Indian child, but inappropriate when considering
jurisdiction.
112. 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (d) requires state courts to give full faith and credit to tribal court proceedings.
113. In Holyfield, the Court recognized state courts' propensity to dismiss too quickly the
jurisdictional questions and instead proceed directly to the substantive issues. The Court reprimanded
those state courts. "Whatever feeling we might have as to [the ultimate placement of Indian children],
however, it is not for us to decide that question. We have been asked to decide the legal question
of who should make the custody determination concerning these children-not what the outcome
of the determination should be." Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30,53
(1989) (emphasis in original). With this admonition, the Court sought to modify state courts'
patronizing view of tribal jurisdiction.
114. 246 Cal. Rptr. 168 (Cal. App. 1988).
115. Id. at 174-75.
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court included in rejecting the request, 116 it noted that consideration of
the child's best interest was good cause to refuse jurisdictional transfer,
finding that the Indian child "was strongly bonded to his foster-adoptive
family, and . . . he perceived them as his psychological family. 11 7 The
court further opined that "[iut would be psychologically injurious to
remove [the Indian child] from [his present] setting.""'
Presumably, a child's psychological well-being is significant justification
for permitting him to remain in his present living situation, and the
California court pointed that out."' 9 Yet the court failed to show how
it was in the child's best interest that the tribal court not hear the case.
While the court gave a good reason for the child to stay where he is,
it failed to demonstrate how transferring this case would harm the child's
best interest. By applying its own local best interest standard at the
jurisdictional stage, the court effectively rejected any tribal participation
in determining what was in an Indian child's best interest.
Robert T., and other cases in which the state courts denied tribal
jurisdiction based on best interest,' 20 are examples of state court paternalism toward tribal courts. By unilaterally and preemptively deciding
what is in an Indian child's best interest, state courts suggest that tribal
court input is unnecessary and irrelevant, and show their lack of faith
in tribal courts. When refusing jurisdictional transfer under the guise of
protecting the Indian child's best interests, state courts seem to be acting
out of fear that the tribal courts might decide a case differently than
state courts and thus harm the Indian child's best interests. To deal with
that fear, state courts simply deny tribal courts of the opportunity to
hear the case.' Such denials are contrary to ICWA's goals, one of which
is to allow tribal courts to adjudicate custody matters involving member
children.
ICWA's framers understood that state courts would find it difficult
to transfer cases to tribal court when the state courts felt they could
best adjudicate a given case. In the Guidelines to interpreting ICWA,
commentators addressed this problem when rejecting inclusion of provisions which would have allowed "good cause" to block a transfer,
even though it was clear only a state court could make a particular

116. The other reasons included the child's lack of contact with his tribe, the tribe's delay in
seeking jurisdiction, and the 1,000 miles between the state and tribal court. Id. at 173-76.
117. Id. at 175.
118. Id. In asserting that removing the child from his present home would harm the child, the
state court apparently, and with no basis, assumes the tribal court would remove the child. Of
course, by not allowing the tribal court even to hear the case, no one, including the Robert T.
court, knows how the tribal court would rule.
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., In re Adoption of T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d 298 (Ind. 1988); In re Maricopa County
Juvenile Action, 828 P.2d 1245 (Ariz. 1991).
121. Fear of tribal courts is fear of the unknown. See, e.g., Catherine Baker Stetson, Preface,
TRIBAL COURT HANDBOOK (1990) ("[T]ribal courts are underused or misused. [State courts and nonIndian practitioners] cannot develop respect for a system they fear .... "), cited in Lisa Driscoll,
Tribal Courts: New Mexico's Third Judiciary, 32 N.M. Bar Bull. 7 (Feb. 18, 1993) at 7.
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disposition which "held especially great promise of benefitting [an Indian]
child.'

1
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The BIA said:

Such considerations are important but they have not been listed because
the Department [of the Interior] believes such judgments are best
made by tribal courts. Parties who believe that state court adjudication
would be better for such reasons can present their reasons to the
tribal court and urge it to decline jurisdiction. The Department ...
believes [this approach] is more in keeping
with the confidence Con123
gress has expressed in tribal courts.
Congress preferred that tribal courts hear Indian child welfare matters,
even when, to the objective non-Indian, it would seem that a state court
could come up with a "better" decision.
Congress, the state courts, and tribal courts can act in concert to
ameliorate the present trend of denying jurisdictional transfer based on
best interest. Congress needs to define what the best interests of Indian
children are, providing state courts with federal guidance as to when,
and when not to deny transfer based on good cause. State courts must
remember that the Indian child's ultimate placement is not a valid reason
to deny transfer. 24 If state courts are going to deny jurisdictional transfer
by simply asserting "best interest", as if that were a generally agreedupon concept, they must be willing to show how transferring to tribal
court is against an Indian child's best interest. Tribal courts can do their
part by reassuring state courts that, as ICWA dictates, tribal courts also
work to protect the best interests of their member children. When state
courts understand that tribal courts consider the Indian child's best interest
when placing the child in foster care, they will be less hesitant to transfer
cases to tribal jurisdiction. In so doing, the tribal courts may allay some
of the latent fear state courts have that tribal courts will do something
contrary to the child's best interest.
IV.
Ignorance is one
different peoples.
know the culture
value and dignity

CONCLUSION

of the greatest barriers to understanding between
If we do not understand each other, if we do not
and history of each other, it is difficult to see the
of each other's societies. This is especially true in

125
relations between Indians and non-Indians.

The ICWA has accomplished only some of its goals. For example,
state courts respect a tribe's right to decline jurisdiction to hear Indian
child custody matters. Contrary to early fears that tribal courts would

122. Guidelines, supra note 66, at 67,584, 67,592.
123. Id.
124. See In re Armell, 550 N.E.2d 1060, 1065 (Ill.
App. 1990) ("[The] issue[] of ... ultimate
placement of the child is not [a] proper consideration[] when .. .deciding the issue of jurisdiction.").
125. Chief Justice Robert Yazzie, Navajo Nation Supreme Court, quoted in Lisa Driscoll, Tribal
Courts: New Mexico's Third Judiciary, 32 N.M. Bar Bull. 7 (Feb. 18, 1993) at 5.
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refuse jurisdiction inequitably, these courts appear eager to accept transfer
and exercise judicial authority. State courts also have acted to protect
the rights of parents of Indian children to veto transfer to tribal courts.
At the same time, state courts recognize that when a tribe gains jurisdiction, that jurisdiction is exclusive of other judicial entities.
Problems arise, however, when state courts refuse to transfer jurisdiction
based on the ethereal concept, good cause. The subjective nature of the
phrase, coupled with relatively scant federal guidance, allows state courts
to fashion an independent conclusion often contrary to tribal interests.
Instead of finding reasons to transfer child custody cases to an Indian
child's tribe, state courts are finding good cause not to transfer the
proceedings. This exercise of concurrent jurisdiction deviates from the
Congressional preference for tribal adjudication over Indian child welfare
matters. States can more fully respect tribal sovereignty by balancing the
burden of transferring cases to tribal courts with the 'federal policy of
granting tribes greater self-government. State courts must also determine
if they properly have jurisdiction before answering the substantive question
of a case. Presently, state courts tend to merge jurisdiction and substance,
with the result that tribes are denied jurisdiction. Finally, in accordance
with ICWA's dictates, states must grant tribal court actions full faith
and credit, and recognize that tribal courts consider an Indian child's
best interests. In so doing, state courts will be less fearful that tribal
courts will act contrary to an Indian child's best interest.
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